

Building stakeholder ship in support for the norm against the misuse of biology and biotechnology

Experiences from the field

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**Building Stakeholders in the Prevention
of the Hostile Use of Biology and Biotechnology**

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Stakeholdership

- Exists within government departments and agencies
 - Foreign Affairs, Finances, Justice, Internal Affairs, Health
 - Law enforcement, Customs, Public health and emergency services, etc.
- Exist in Parliaments
- Exists among civil society constituencies
- Exists among scientific and professional communities
 - Universities
 - Laboratories
 - Industry

Perception of issues

- Biological weapon threat seen as ‘fetish’ of the West and USA in particular
- However, concern about:
 - Cross-border spread diseases (human, as well as animal & plant)
 - Inability to control what enters the country: port & border security are primary concerns, and there is appreciation of the risk this may pose to the hinterland.
 - Transshipment issues
 - Nexus between criminal networks and terrorism
- Such concerns form foundation for building stakeholder ship

Government & Parliaments

- Many ministries and agencies are involved in ratification / accession process, as well as parliament in some cases
 - Clear need for raising issue awareness and building capacity to deal with BTWC requirements
 - A national interest in BW disarmament & non-proliferation needs to be build up
- Relevant regional organisations do not place biological control on their agenda, so there is no peer pressure from regional states to join relevant treaties (e.g., the BTWC) or adopt necessary legislation and regulations
- Under the best of circumstances a single individual within the government bureaucracy will have a personal interest in BTWC
- Often lack of fundamental knowledge about key issues
 - Limited technical and scientific understanding of issues involved
 - Many states not party to the BTWC have no developed base in biology or biotechnology
 - Limited knowledge of biotechnology activities undertaken by foreign companies on their territory (often no legal framework for licensing, and thus tracking such activities)


Civil society, scientific and professional communities

- Primary concerns are elsewhere (e.g., health & food security, crime, etc.).
- Relevant interest is extremely difficult to kindle, let alone sustain
- Threat is abstract
 - In the future
 - Difficult to visualize
 - No interest from potential moral entrepreneurs
- Linkage between scientific and industrial activities and potential contribution to biological warfare or terrorism and crime with biological agents often disputed by scientists and professionals

Requirements to support the norm

- Involvement is required as well as interaction among
 - Governments, Parliament, agencies
 - Civil society constituencies
 - Industry and scientific communities
- Raising issue awareness and building capacity (including basic briefings and training) is the primary need
- Outreach activities by individual states, regional organizations or civil society organizations are key

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